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Abstract
A new type of attack is introduced which takes advantage of MAC truncation
to simplify key recovery attacks based on MAC verifications. One example
of the attack is described which, in certain circumstances, enables a more
efficient attack than was previously known to be launched against the ANSI
retail MAC. The existence of this attack means that truncation for this MAC
scheme should be used with greater care than was previously believed, and
very short MACs should be avoided altogether.
1 Introduction
MACs, i.e. Message Authentication Codes, are a widely used method for
protecting the integrity and guaranteeing the origin of transmitted messages
and stored files. To use a MAC it is necessary for the sender and recipient
of a message (or the creator and verifier of a stored file) to share a secret
key K, chosen from some (large) keyspace. The data string to be protected,
D say, is input to a MAC function f , along with the secret key K, and the
output is the MAC. We write MAC = fK(D). The MAC is then sent or
stored with the message.
1.1 The ANSI retail MAC
The ANSI retail MAC scheme [1], otherwise known as CBC-MAC-Y or
ISO/IEC 9797-1 algorithm 3 [3], operates as follows. Suppose the underlying
block cipher has n-bit blocks and uses a key of k bits. If X is an n-bit
block then we write eK(X) (or dK(X)) for the block cipher encryption (or
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decryption) of X using key K. A message D is first padded and split into
a sequence of q n-bit blocks: D1, D2, . . . , Dq. The MAC scheme uses a pair
of keys K, K ′. The MAC computation is as follows.
H1 = eK(D1),
Hi = eK(Di ⊕Hi−1), (2 ≤ i ≤ q), and
MAC = eK(dK′(Hq)).
For the purposes of this paper we assume that the padding method does not
involve prefixing the data with a length block. Note that the MAC used will
be truncated to the left-most m bits of the MAC value given in the above
equation, where m ≤ n.
1.2 Security considerations
Following the approach used in [3], we use a four-tuple [a, b, c, d] to quantify
the resources needed for an attack, where a denotes the number of off-
line block cipher encipherments (or decipherments), b denotes the number
of known data string/MAC pairs, c denotes the number of chosen data
string/MAC pairs, and d denotes the number of on-line MAC verifications.
Note c and d are distinguished because, in some environments, it may be
easier for an attacker to obtain MAC verifications (i.e. to submit a data
string/MAC pair and learn whether the MAC is valid) than to obtain the
MAC for a chosen message.
In the analysis of MAC algorithms based on a block cipher with a k-bit key,
it is standard to assume that the block cipher itself is secure, and hence a
key recovery attack will require at least 2k invocations of the block cipher.
The best known key recovery attack on the ANSI retail MAC algorithm has
complexity [2k+1,2n/2,0,0], as described in [7]. An alternative key recovery
attack, requiring only one known MAC/data string pair, but a larger number
of verifications, is presented in [5]; this attack has complexity [2k,1,0,2k]. Fi-
nally, a further key recovery attack based on MAC verifications is presented
in [4]; this latter attack has complexity
[2k+1, d(max(k, n) + 1)/me, 0, d(k − n+m+ 1)/me2n]
given that k − n+m+ 1 > 0.
2 The new attack
Suppose that an attacker has access to a device capable of performing MAC
verifications (this is the scenario of the attack described in [5]). We now
present an attack which, in many cases where m < n, requires fewer MAC
verifications than the attacks of [4, 5].
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2.1 Attack description
The attack operates as follows. The attacker first generates a sequence of
messages by some means, and for each generated message M tests whether
or not fK,K′(M) = 0m, where f denotes the ANSI retail MAC function, and
0m denotes a block of m zero bits. If this equation holds then the message
M is stored, and this process continues until a total of 2(n−m)/2 messages
have been found for which the above equation holds. Label this collection
of messages,
{M0,M1, . . . ,M2(n−m)/2−1}.
The attacker now chooses dn/me − 1 arbitrary n-bit blocks
{X1, X2, . . . , Xdn/me−1}.
For every i (1 ≤ i ≤ dn/me − 1) the attacker now uses as many MAC
verifications as necessary to learn the MACs of the following set of 2(n−m)/2
messages:
{M0||Xi,M1||Xi, . . . ,M2(n−m)/2−1||Xi}.
The attacker now assembles a collection of 2(n−m)/2 ordered (dn/me − 1)-
tuples of MACs, computed on the (dn/me − 1)-tuples of messages
(Mj ||X1,Mj ||X2, . . . ,Mj ||Xdn/me−1)
0 ≤ j ≤ 2(n−m)/2 − 1. If two of these tuples of MACs are equal, say the
MACs are equal for the tuples of messages
(Mj ||X1,Mj ||X2, . . . ,Mj ||Xdn/me−1)
and
(Mj′ ||X1,Mj′ ||X2, . . . ,Mj′ ||Xdn/me−1)
than there is a very good chance that a ‘real’ collision has been found, i.e.
messages Mj and Mj′ whose n-bit MACs prior to truncation are equal.
Such a message pair can then be used to launch an exhaustive key search to
recover the MAC key, exactly as described in [7].
2.2 Analysis of attack
First note that, given an arbitrary messageM , the probability that fK,K′(M) =
0m can be assumed to be 2−m. Hence, the expected number of MAC veri-
fications required to find the sequence of messages M0,M1, . . . ,M2(n−m)/2−1
all having a zero MAC is simply
2(n−m)/2 × 2m = 2(n+m)/2.
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Next observe that the expected number of MAC verifications necessary to
learn a MAC is precisely 2m−1. Hence, the total number of MAC verifica-
tions required for the next stage of the attack, i.e. to compute all the tuples
of MACs, is
2m−1 × 2(n−m)/2 × (dn/me − 1) = (dn/me − 1)2(n+m)/2−1.
This gives a total number of MAC verifications of (dn/me+ 1)2(n+m)/2−1.
Now if Mj and Mj′ have the property that their n-bit MACs prior to trun-
cation are equal, then this will also be true for Mj ||X and Mj′ ||X for any
block X. Hence, if two such messages Mj and Mj′ occur in the set, then
they will be detected by the described approach. We next need to consider
the probability that there will exist two such messages. Given that we chose
the set of messages to have the property that the left-most m bits of the
untruncated MAC are equal, then we need to consider the probability that
a set of 2(n−m)/2 messages will contain a pair of messages whose untrun-
cated n-bit MACs agree in the right-most n−m bit positions. By the usual
‘birthday paradox’ arguments (see, for example, section 2.1.5 of [6]) there is
a good chance that two such messages will exist.
We also need to consider the probability that a pair of messages will give
rise to a ‘false alarm’, i.e. that there will exist a pair of messages whose
tuples of MACs agree but whose untruncated MACs disagree. The number
of such pairs will be small, and such pairs can be eliminated by using a small
number of additional MAC verifications.
Finally observe that, given a ‘colliding pair’ of messages, the attack to re-
cover the key, as described in [7], requires 2k+1 off-line encryptions (assum-
ing that the messages are all short — in the scenario described here that is
simple to arrange). Thus the total attack complexity is
[2k+1, 0, 0, (dn/me+ 1)2(n+m)/2−1].
We conclude by tabulating the complexity of the attack (in terms of MAC
verifications) for some typical values of m and n.
Table 1: MAC verifications required for attack
n m Number of MAC verifications
64 8 238
64 16 241
64 24 245
64 32 249
64 48 256
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3 Observations
As can be seen from Table 1, for DES this attack is more efficient than
the attack of [5] (which requires 256 MAC verifications) for all cases where
m < 48. The rather surprising conclusion is that the use of short MACs
makes launching key recovery attacks easier!
Of course, it might be argued that when MACs are truncated the trivial
‘verification forgery’ attack (see, for example, [2, 3]) can be used. That
is, when an m-bit MAC is used, a forgery can be found using 2m−1 MAC
verifications (on average). Although the above attack is more powerful in
that it recovers the key, the number of MAC verifications required is so much
larger than the number required for a single forgery that it may not have
any importance in practice.
However, if the MAC key (or a simple variant of the key) is also used for
encryption then key recovery is clearly a very serious issue. For example,
where the block cipher is DES, closely related pairs of keys may be used for
ANSI retail MAC computation and triple DES encryption. Typically the
MAC key pair is derived from the encryption key pair by ex-oring it with a
fixed mask. In such a case the attack described here has potentially serious
consequences.
4 Conclusions
A MAC verification based key recovery attack on the ANSI retail MAC
has been demonstrated that, in the case where the MAC is truncated, can
require significantly fewer MAC verifications than previously known attacks.
This is especially significant where a MAC key (or a simple variant of it)
may also be used for encryption.
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